Following a review of current scholarship on identity and integration patterns of Russian speakers in the Baltic states, this article proposes an analytical framework to help understand current trends. Rogers Brubaker's widely-employed triadic nexus is expanded to demonstrate why a form of Russian-speaking identity has been emerging, but has failed to become fully consolidated, and why significant integration has occurred structurally but not identificationally. By enumerating the subfields of political, economic, and cultural 'stances' and 'representations' the model helps to understand the complicated integration processes of minority groups that possess complex relationships with 'external homelands', 'nationalizing states' and 'international organizations'. Ultimately, it is argued that socio-economic factors largely reduce the capacity for a consolidated identity; political factors have a moderate tendency to reduce this capacity; while cultural factors generally increase the potential for a consolidated group identity. 
The review is used in order to construct a coherent theoretical and analytical framework to understand current trends in the development of Russian-speaking identities in the Baltic states. Rogers Brubaker's 'triadic nexus' is used as a starting point for this task. By elaborating upon Brubaker's nexus, a more causal model is developed that can help policymakers and academics understand more fully contemporary identificational trends among Russian speakers in the Baltic states.
The analysis of previous research is used to demonstrate the validity of distinguishing between cultural, political, and economic forms of attraction and repulsion. In so doing this paper argues that it is possible to conceptualize more fully the complex, 'quadratic' interactions between Russian speakers, the Baltic states, the European Union, and Russia. As the analysis shows, Russia generally has the potential for high cultural attraction but relatively low political and economic attraction for Russian speakers, while the Baltic states have low cultural attraction, relatively high economic attraction, and contradictory levels of political attraction. These factors mean that there are conflicting pressures on Russian speakers to consolidate their internal identity and to integrate into the social and political lives of the Baltic states. This expanded nexus also has direct relevance to the study of other minority groups that have potentially important relationships with 'external homelands' and 'nationalizing states'.
Russian-speaking nationality?
One of the most pressing questions that has concerned researchers of post-Soviet, Russianspeaking identity in the Baltic states relates to the question of group identity. To what extent is it valid to recognize a well-defined community of Russian speakers?
1 Should Russian speakers be treated as a national or ethnic minority or does the large diversity within this group make such categorizations problematic?
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union scholars were unclear how to label the non-Estonian/Latvian/Lithuania populations of the Baltic states. The appropriateness of treating Russians or Russian-speakers as a singular group has been questioned, as any given label comes with its own misleading assumptions (Poppe & Hagendoorn 2001) . This was evidenced by early studies that found it problematic to talk of a unified Russian/Russian-speaking community with common interests (Kirch 1992; Kirch, Kirch & Tuisk 1993; Aasland 1994; Melvin 1995) .
Numerous factors have been identified to explain the weakness of collective identity in this early, post-Soviet period. Graham Smith (1996, 208) notes that Russian speakers were divided by their rootedness (length of residence in the Baltic region), language practice, occupation, and nationality (national'nost'). Particular attention has been paid to the legacy of Soviet nationality policies as an explanatory factor for weak collective identities (Agarin 2010; Brubaker 1994) . Multilayered Soviet practices resulted in the absence of a strong sense of Russianness when the Soviet Union collapsed. For example, Russian and Soviet were terms that were often conflated. Many Russian speakers in the Baltic states initially considered themselves first and foremost Soviet citizens rather than Russians (Vihalemm & Masso 2003, 101) . In 1990, for example, Linz and Stepan (1996, 411) found that only 4.2% of non-Latvians in Latvia stated that they felt primarily 'of Russia'. In Estonia the corresponding figure was 12%. Indeed, the Soviet practice of rigidly demarcating and maintaining personal definitions of nationality (natsional'nost') meant that many Russian speakers actually considered themselves to be Ukrainian, Belarusian etc. rather than Russian.
The fragmented nature of these identities leads us to question the validity of studying Russian speakers as a meaningful group. However, in the post-Soviet era, a number of scholars have also pointed to the relative consolidation of Russian-speaking identity (distinct from Russian identity). David Laitin (1995) has gone furthest in identifying an emergent 'Russian-speaking nationality' in the Baltic states. This identity is distinct from Russian identity and is consolidated around the 'Balticization' of Russian speakers (Melvin 1995) .
Supporting this view there is much evidence that Russian speakers in the Baltic states view themselves as fundamentally different from Russians in Russia (Zepa 2006; Vihalemm & Masso 2003; Cheskin 2013; Fein 2005) .
Additionally, there is evidence that a form of group consciousness has been evolving which centres around the linguistic categorization of 'Russian-speakers' (Tabuns 2010, 260-264; Cheskin 2010; Kronenfeld 2005, 272; Cheskin 2013, 293-294) . This is clearly apparent in the media where the term Russian-speaker is increasingly used as a linguistic signifier to describe an otherwise fairly disparate group (Cheskin 2010; Khanov 2002, 14 The literature therefore identifies two seemingly contradictory tendencies -on the one hand the disavowal of certain links with Russia, and fragmentated identities, and on the other hand a relative consolidation of linguistic identity, centring on the Russian language.
While, on first inspection, this may appear to present somewhat of a conundrum, in fact it is potentially explained when we distinguish between cultural and political forms of identification. Russian-speaking identity in the Baltic states shows some signs of consolidating around cultural preferences, notably the Russian language. At the same time, political and territorial links with Russia seem to be weakening. These ideational developments have great significance not only for Russian-speaking identities but also for the integration strategies pursued by Russian speakers. For one thing this trend towards identification along linguistic lines (Cheskin 2012, 326-327; Cianetti 2014, 2) has meant that, in the Baltic states, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and other Soviet nationalities are potentially able to find a discursive place within a well-defined imagined community. 2 Culturally at least, this opens up the possibility for Russia to exert a meaningful influence, not just over Russians, but also over a broader categorization of Russian speakers.
Russian speakers and integration
Many observers have examined the issue of Russian-speaking identities from the perspective of the integration dynamics inherent within the Baltic states. Such research has largely been informed by John Berry's theoretical model of inter-cultural relations (Berry, 1997) . Based on a cross-cultural psychology approach, Berry notes the importance of cultural interactions in determining human behaviour (6). He outlines four main acculturation models for individuals who are faced with cross-cultural contact: assimilation (giving up one culture and adopting another), integration (embracing both cultures), separation (maintaining one culture and avoiding contact with another), and marginalization (alienation from both cultures).
The theme of integration has been most visible in Latvia and Estonia, where, citizenship was initially withheld from the majority of Russian speakers. This was grounded on the principle that the Baltic states had been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. Soviet-era immigrants, therefore, did not constitute a legal part of the countries' 'core nations' (Smith et al. 1998) .
Following international pressure, citizenship laws were finally introduced allowing Russian speakers to naturalize if they could meet certain requirements, including language knowledge and having a basic grasp of the country's history (see Barrington 2000) .
Eduard Ponarin (2000 Ponarin ( , 1538 has noted that because of increasing numbers of Russian speakers who have thus been able to acquire citizenship, there is now a 'race between intergenerational assimilation and increasing political power of the Russophone population.'
On the one hand there is pressure on non-titular 3 groups to integrate, or assimilate, into Baltic societies, therefore diluting the strength of any Russian-speaking identity. On the other hand the increased political power that accompanies an increase in the size of a potentially ethnicized electorate could lead to the opposite effect and an increase in the political capital of a consolidated Russophone identity.
An assessment of which of these competitors, 'integration/assimilation' or 'political consolidation', is currently leading the race is complicated. In 1998 David Laitin proposed a competitive assimilation argument, positing that Russian speakers would assimilate into Baltic societies both linguistically and culturally. He based this assessment on his 'tipping' model of identity formation. As soon as Russian-speaking individuals perceived the rational benefits (both economically and socially) of learning the state language as greater than maintaining monolingualism, they would learn the state language and assimilate (21-24).
Notwithstanding the theoretical sophistication of Laitin's reasoning, subsequent studies have shown that a majority of Russian speakers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have a preference for integration over assimilation (Kemppainen et al. 2004; Kronenfeld 2005; Pisarenko 2006; Šūpule 2007; Kasatkina 2006) . These studies show clear evidence that
Russian speakers commonly have a desire to learn the culture and language associated with their state of residence, whilst simultaneously maintaining Russian cultural and linguistic identities. While it is apparent that Russian speakers are increasingly likely to learn Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian (Zabrodskaja 2009; Ernstsone & Mežs 2008, 195) they are no less likely to want to display their cultural 'Russianness'. This leads Pisarenko (2006, 767) to the conclusion that it is more appropriate to talk about 'competitive integration and bilingualism than assimilation'.
Significantly, the current body of research on Latvia and Estonia challenges linear assimilation models which predict that increased integration in one area (for example, linguistic proficiency of the majority language) will lead to increased integration overall, and eventually to full assimilation into the core society. Nimmerfeldt, Schulze and Taru At the heart of the Estonian and Latvian governments' early programmes was the conviction that the success of their integration strategies rested upon improving structural integration (i.e. increased access to the countries' political and social institutions) by raising Russian speakers' linguistic knowledge of the official state languages. However, as Nimmerfeldt et al.
note, the riots in the centre of Tallinn in 2007 (see below) were carried out by youth who, in many instances, were highly proficient in Estonian. This has led policy makers in both countries to reassess their integration policies. By studying this phenomenon along these four axes, it is possible to see that, contrary to the expectations of policy-makers, Russian speakers with higher levels of structural integration do not generally display significant increases in social or identificational integration. The only positive and statistically significant relationship was between structural integration and cultural integration (measured by Estonian language knowledge).
This raises the question of why integration does not follow the linear model that has been identified in other geographical areas. Kruusvall, Vetik, and Berry (2009, 15) cite negative attitudes of the majority group, rather than demographics or socio-economic factors, as the central impediments for successful integration. Indeed, Kulliki Korts (2010, 117) observes that there is a big difference in the way that integration is perceived from an Estonian, compared with a Russian-speaking, perspective. Consequently, it is a weakness of the current literature that relatively little focus is placed upon the positions of majority Latvian and Estonian groups vis-à-vis Russian speakers.
Brigita Zepa et al (2006, 26) , in one of the most comprehensive studies of integration practice in Latvia, and one of the few to focus on majority opinions, found that among Latvians there was actually broad support for non-Latvians who pursued either assimilation or integration strategies. In their survey of over 600 Latvian respondents, integration strategies were rated marginally more favourably than those of marginalization.
This seemingly contradicts the hypothesis that Estonian and Latvian attitudes impede the integration process. However, in addition to prevalent societal attitudes of the majority group it is important to consider the institutional realities that underpin the integration programmes. A number of authors, for example, highlight the discrepancy between the stated aims of Estonian and Latvian integration policies and their actual institutionalization (Pettai 2003; Agarin 2009; Malloy 2009 ). As Timofey Agarin argues, the institutions connected with the integration programmes have been 'designed to attend to the interests of the dominant ethnic group' (Agarin 2009, 199 
Socio-economics and Russophone identity
Another factor that is often cited for the failure of integration policy centres is socio- argues that the protesters were motivated because they 'felt that Estonians had better opportunities for jobs and education as well as for participation in political and community life because of their belonging to the core nation ' (2011, 1101) .
Economic studies of average wage earnings suggest that, even controlling for geographical segregations, levels of education, and language skills, non-Latvians and non-Estonians face an 'ethnic wage gap' (Leping & Toomet 2008) . For Estonia the mean wage was found to be as much as 10-15% higher for Estonian workers than non-Estonians. In Latvia Mihaels Even if this assessment is more accurate than that of Hughes, it is still important to consider the regime of discrimination argument. Objective economic realities are not always as important as prevailing economic perceptions. Therefore it is not sufficient solely to consider the impact of economic discrimination. Instead we should also be aware that political and cultural practices may lead to increased perceptions of economic discrimination. In the 1990s language legislation was introduced in the Baltic states demanding proficiency in the state languages (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian) in order to find employment in certain professions (Dobson & Jones 1998 41-42) . Arguably, however, this has had minimal effect on economic inequality. A majority of professions which require the highest levels of linguistic proficiency are in the poorly-paid public sector. The language laws therefore have greatest effect in excluding monolingual Russian speakers from poorly-paid public sector jobs (Toomet 2011, 529 and even more so for Estonia. In Estonia, ethnic Russian political parties have fared poorly in elections and, with the notable exception of the 'Bronze Nights' in 2007, violent mobilization has rarely occurred in any form. In this light it is worth revisiting socio-economic arguments from a different perspective.
From a purely Baltic perspective, economic discrimination, and perceptions of economic discrimination, may well have aided the consolidation of a form of Russian-speaking identity.
However, if we take a more international perspective, and examine socio-economic factors in relation to Russia, then we can see why Russophones in the Baltic states have been so politically passive (adopting strategies of symbolic exit as well as loyalty rather than voice).
When it was clear that violent patterns of ethnic conflict were not developing in the Baltic states, a number of commentators started to search for explanatory variables to explain this lack of violence. Ain Haas, writing in 1996, considered a number of important explanations including political culture, history, and relative power balance between the two main ethnic groups. Significantly one of the variables singled out by Haas was the relatively high pace of economic reform in Estonia compared to Russia. Baltic Russians, he noted, 'feel that they would have little to gain from Russia ' (1996, 70) where the economic situation was more chaotic and had fewer job prospects.
For Magdalena Solska (2011) , these economic factors help to explain why Estonia's internal ethnic tensions are less strained than Latvia's. Solska presents an optimistic (I would strongly suggest overly optimistic) account of Estonia's success in creating a unified political community, where 'ethnicity is not politicised any more' (1106). Nevertheless, while Solska's optimism should be questioned, she presents a good case to suggest that Estonia has been more successful than either Lithuania or Latvia in this regard. At the heart of this success Solska cites the economic performance of the Estonian government which has led to increased trust in political institutions and therefore increased value in Estonian citizenship compared with either Lithuania or Latvia (1104). This corresponds with the argument put forward by Külliki Korts (2009, 130) and Vihalemm and Kalmus (2009, 110) 
that Estonian
Russians have become more similar to Estonians in their general thought patterns, and somewhat differentiated from their parents as a result of Estonia's consumerist, and globalized culture.
Additionally, there is evidence that Russian-language media and political discourses in the Baltic states have been slowly shifting away from an exclusive focus on discrimination, to a more optimistic assessment of the economic position of Russian speakers. In Latvia, where
Russian maintains a more pervasive influence than in the other two Baltic states, an increasingly popular observation is that tri-lingual (Russian, Latvian, and English) Russian speakers often have an inherent advantage in the labour market over their bi-lingual (Latvian and English) Latvian counterparts (Cheskin 2010, 342; Cheskin 2013, 307) . Discourses of ethnic discrimination, while not disappearing, are therefore being interspersed with more optimistic accounts.
Overall we can conclude that the socio-economic picture for Russophones in the Baltic states is complex. While, on the one hand, perceptions of economic discrimination have arguably aided the formation of a consolidated form of identity, recent developments suggest that socio-economic factors may also have a positive impact on integration. However, these more positive trends have not been sufficient for experts to rate Latvia and Estonia's integration programmes as successful. A wide-ranging study in 2010, while noting some positive trends, concluded that Latvian society remained 'not very integrated' (Muižnieks 2010, 284) . In It therefore appears that structural integration (increased access to economic and political opportunities) has not led directly to greater social and identificational integration.
Consequently we can see that language skills, access to citizenship, and socio-economic wellbeing are not the only factors that determine the levels of social and identificational integration. Another area of ever more importance to researchers and policy-makers is the phenomenon of collective memories.
History, memory and state narratives
For Vita Zelče (2009, 54) For many scholars this memory divide is a natural result of the state and nation-building policies pursued by all three Baltic states in the late Soviet and early independence periods.
In the Baltic states grand narratives of the past were invoked which were clearly linked to the emergent independent states (Smith et al. 1998, 99-109; Eglitis 2002) . While Lithuania was not as explicit in tying its citizenship to these historical narratives, it was nonetheless clear that Lithuanian language and culture were to be the bases for Lithuanian state and nationhood.
The prominence of memory in recent scholarship shows that Russia can have a potentially significant influence on Russian-speaking identity in the Baltic states. Russophones are exposed to the cultural and political memory narratives of the Russian state through extensive consumption of Russia's media (Lerhis 2007: 54) , and many continue to feel close cultural connections to the identities signified by Russia's officially propagated collective memories (Cheskin 2013, 296) .
In terms of integration, the issue of memory also demonstrates that certain forms of identity stand apart from linguistic, socio-economic, and structural factors. If we are to understand the integration and identity dynamics of Russian speakers in more detail, it is therefore necessary to develop a model that can take account of all of these aspects including socioeconomics, language, politics, and more cultural understandings such as those encapsulated by memory. It has been observed, however, that Brubaker's nexus works better as a conceptual model than as a causal construct (Pettai 2006, 133) . One reason is Brubaker's insistence that the nexus be seen in relative, rather than objective, terms. This proceeds from the author's theoretically complex understandings of nationalism, which he notes are not analytically irreducible (Brubaker 1996, 67) .
In order to avoid essentializing the nexus Brubaker depicts the nodes in terms of relative 'fields' which themselves are not static. Additionally, and this has largely been ignored in the subsequent literature, Brubaker notes the importance of stances and representations within the triadic interplay (68-69; see also Pettai 2006, 133) . Stances can be understood as discursive practices as well as more concrete policies that emerge from a certain (relative, contested, and non-static) field. Representations, on the other hand, are the selective ways that an external field is perceived. Although Brubaker goes into very little detail, it is surprising that this aspect of the nexus has not been explored more fully.
For Brubaker's nexus to be effectively utilized it is important to combine the study of policies and events with discursive, perceptual elements. By merging these considerations into our understanding of stances and perceptions the nexus becomes more useful in understanding the conflicting processes surrounding the formation and consolidation of Russian-speaking identity. Indeed, it is my argument that this framework can help to explain why a solidified form of Russian-speaking identity has emerged in some respects, while it is also weakly formulated in others.
Significantly, the data presented above give reason to believe that a high number of Russian speakers continue to represent and perceive the Baltic states as nationalizing and discriminatory. This is not to say that the Baltic states are discriminatory. Rather, as Brubaker himself notes, it is more a question of whether states are perceived to be nationalizing than whether they are 'really' nationalizing (Brubaker 1996, 63) .
On the other hand, the evidence also suggests that Baltic Russian speakers increasingly perceive themselves as different from Russians in Russia. In previous research Russian speakers have pointed to their perceived 'Europeaness' as a factor that separates them from Russians in Russia (Cheskin, 2013: 294-295) . The globalized, trans-European environs of the EU therefore also influence the position of Russian speakers in the Baltic states (Vihalem & Masso, 2003: 24) . It is therefore essential to understand the complex interplay between the four nodes of the quadratic nexus.
Russian speakers are subject to a number of contradictory forces. At one level Russianspeaking identity can be solidified through self-marginalizing strategies (Golubeva et al. 2007 ) which discursively portray 'their' group to be discriminated against by the ('nationalizing') Baltic states. At the same time their identity as Baltic Russians, and therefore distinct from Russians in Russia, pushes them back towards identification with the Baltic states. This, in turn, weakens the internal solidity of a group identity which has been based on the notion that they are, in fact, different from Estonians/Latvians/Lithuanians.
Additionally, European structures and discourses also potentially influence identity patterns by providing economic and symbolic inducements away from the homeland nationalism of the Russian Federation.
To complicate matters more, certain stances from the nationalizing state and the external homeland are perceived positively, while others negatively. To make sense of this conceptually, and drawing on the analysis above, a useful approach is to divide each field into the three sub-fields of politics, economics, and culture (see figure 2 ). This division is not designed to be static. Instead each sub-field refers to the representations that Russian speakers may have of certain aspects of the nationalizing state, their external homeland, and international organizations. Although there are a number of possible international organizations that can influence Russian-speaking identity, for the sake of parsimony, and recognizing the preeminent role of the EU, the following section focuses exclusively on the European Union (understood as a symbolic, political, and territorial entity) when referring to the fourth node of 'international organizations'. It is important to note that, as with Brubaker's original fields, the sub-fields are highly contested, negotiable, and subject to change.
The four categories help to conceptualize the extent by which individuals relate to, identify with, or feel estranged from each node. Politically this is manifested in, among other things, Using this expanded frame of reference we can see some of the contradictory identity pressures that Russian speakers encounter. (Brubaker 2009, 29) . Lithuanian citizenship is concurrently EU citizenship, we may speculate that politically the EU is an attractive force that adds value to Baltic citizenship. However, more research is needed in this area.
As well as helping to understand some of the trends in group identity formation, the tabulation in table 1 helps to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of integration strategies. Earlier it was noted that Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia have displayed increasing levels of structural and cultural integration (measured by access to political and social channels and knowledge of the state language respectively). At the same time, levels of social and identificational integration have remained relatively low. Cultural integration is rather narrowly defined in this respect and does not correspond to the much broader subfield of culture which has been employed within the nexus. With these trends in mind, focus on the nexus' sub-fields allows us to see direct links between the complex interplays between nationalizing states, national minorities, national homelands, and international organizations.
It is fair to suggest that the sub-fields of politics and economics, although sometimes contradictory, generally exert a positive pull on Russian speakers towards the Baltic states.
There are real (and perceived) political and economic incentives for Russian speakers to acquire Baltic citizenship and to learn the state languages. We may posit that Russia generally does not offer the same level of political or economic attractiveness. As a result we can witness relatively high structural and cultural integration.
However, it is important not to overlook entirely the potential for Russia's political On the other hand, notwithstanding successes in terms of structural and cultural integration, identificational integration remains relatively low (especially for Latvia and Estonia). This can be attributed to the greater level of attractiveness that the external homeland represents in this area. Additionally, the cultural stances of the Baltic states continue to be perceived rather negatively. Many Russian speakers therefore still view Baltic cultures in terms of 'their' and not 'our' culture (Cheskin 2013, 304-305) . This is especially true for Latvia and Estonia, where the titular cultures and languages have not been projected as inclusive, but instead in highly ethnicized terms. This can be seen in the restrictive citizenship laws and the particularly one-sided premises of the countries' respective integration programmes. For the case of Lithuania the cultural attraction of the Lithuanian state for Russian speakers appears to be more positive than for their counterparts in either Latvia or Estonia. To some extent, however, identification with the abstract concept of Europe can mitigate the cultural push factor of the nationalizing state by offering Russian speakers a layer of identification that further demarcates them from Russians in Russia.
Overall then this differentiated approach to Brubaker's triadic nexus is very fruitful. Rather than seeing 'nationalizing states' as monolithic entities that either attract or repel 'national minorities', this expanded model shows the contradictory influences of each of the nodes on the nexus. It also allows us to hypothesize conditions that would facilitate full assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation (table 2) .
For full assimilation to occur Russia would need to have very little attraction while the Baltic states would require significant attraction either directly, or indirectly, via the appeal of the EU and 'Europeaness'. For integration The Baltic states would need to exert similarly high levels of attraction but Russia would need to exert some form of cultural appeal.
Marginalization would occur when none of the three nodes exerted any meaning attraction.
Full separation, for its part, would be likely where the external homeland was significantly more attractive than the nationalizing state of residence. In all of these instances, stances and representations of and towards the EU can be expected to correlate with levels of attraction with the Baltic states. Because, unlike Russia, the Baltic states are EU member states, we can expect positive association with the EU to correlate with positive association with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. conducive to any one of these four integration strategies (although the situation will differ from individual to individual). It also means that there are certain incentives to form a consolidated group identity, while simultaneously opposing pressures against such a development.
Conclusions
Perhaps one of the most fundamental, and yet complex, questions this paper has addressed relates to the group status of Russian speakers. Do Russian speakers actually constitute a national minority? Obviously this question needs to be addressed at a discursive level where it is understood that all nation groups are ultimately imagined. Nevertheless, the survey of the current literature, combined with the insights from Brubaker's nexus, allow us to see the contradictory processes that both facilitate and impede the formation of a 'Russian-speaking nationality' in the Baltic states. We may conclude that a relatively stable form of Russianspeaking identity has emerged but that it remains fairly fragmented. While the analysis above is based on data from the existing literature, future research that employs this framework will be able to examine the stances and representations within the nexus in more detail. For example, the stances of the 'nationalizing state' can first be mapped out by examining policy choices and political discourses that relate to the subfields of economics, politics and culture. These can be quantitative economic data and specific policies as well as discursive representations that come from state structures and their associated representatives.
Next, qualitative data from Russian speakers can be used to assess their perceptions of these policies and the affect they have on their identity positions. In other words, fitting with the process-focused approach, the emphasis is not on what policies are, but how they operate and are perceived. At the same time, public portrayals of Russian speaking identity can be categorised as stances in their own right. Again, these can be discursive articulations by political groups and prominent individuals, or they can be concrete actions such as protests or campaigns. These can then be used in a triangulated approach to see how and if the stances of the nationalizing state respond to the publicly articulated positions of Russian speakers. Data for this can be drawn from interviews with cultural and political elites, and also from discourse analysis of public articulations. Russia is able to build upon its already significant cultural attractiveness in this manner, then
Russia will also have much potential to increase its political attractiveness, at least for certain groups of Russophones in the Baltic states. In Latvia this can already be seen in the public support given to Russia's incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula by the increasingly vocal political party 'Russian Union of Latvia' (2014).
Additionally, the stances of the 'nationalizing states' continue to shape identities and integration patterns within the three countries. For the reasons discussed above, in the 1990s Russian speakers generally refrained from opposing restrictive citizenship and language policies through open mobilization. However, with an increasingly assertive and seemingly confident Russia, the implications of further nationalizing policies may be very different today. Not only has Russia been able to maintain cultural appeal, it now has more economic and political potential. For the case of Crimea, Russia was able to refer to historical and cultural ties with the peninsular, but also pointed to the political illegitimacy of the Kyiv ('fascist') authorities and promised Crimean residents higher pensions and economic prosperity (Kyiv Post 2014). The reframed nexus allows us to bear these international and domestic contexts in mind. As such, Baltic policy-makers will do well to consider carefully the representations that their policy and discursive stances will produce among Russian speakers. When making these domestic policy assessments the economic, political, and cultural appeal of Russia should never be ignored.
1 In this article Russian speakers (without a hyphen) is used to describe individuals whose first language is Russian. Russian-speakers (with a hyphen) is used to refer to a group, understood as an imagined community. For grammatical clarity the hyphen is maintained when using the term in adjectival form, e.g. 'Russian-speaking identity'. 2 For an overview of Soviet nationalities policies see Kaiser 1997 3 Within the federal system of the Soviet Union titular ethnicity (titul'naya natsional'nost') refered to the ethnic groups which gave their name to union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs; their so-called 'root nation' (Korennaya natsiya). In the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic -'Latvians' were the titular nation; in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic -'Chechens' and 'Ingushians' etc. 4 Nimmerfeldt et al. define structural integration as 'the acquisition of rights and equal access to the major institutions of society'. Cultural integration is defined as 'the process of cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal change that occurs when individuals from different cultures come into contact.' Social integration they define as 'the degree to which members of different groups are segregated and the degree to which they interact'. Finally, they define identity integration as focusing on 'ethnic and national self-identifications. ' (2011: 78-79) 5 For detailed accounts see Brüggemann & Kasekamp (2008) and Smith (2008) . 6 The wage gap in Estonia was 16% and 9% in Lithuania 7 For a debate on this issue see Hughes (2005b) and Muižnieks (2005) . 8 Exit can be defined as secession from the dominant regime by a group, or outward migration for individuals, or symbolic exit whereby individuals and groups reside in a given territory but take relatively little interest in political, economic, or social life. Loyalty is generally manifested in assimilation or integration into the host society. Voice represents ethnic mobilization through non-violent engagement with institutions and politics, or through recourse to more militant channels. See Evans 1998, 59. 9 This is despite the fact that there have been a number of visible exceptions including the education reform 
